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A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger
May 2008
The Preliminary Report of the New York Commission on Property Tax Relief
The preliminary report of the New York Commission on Property Tax Relief is full of good 
information and thoughtful policy recommendations.1   Elected officials and citizens interested in 
property tax relief would benefit from reading it carefully.  
 
Nevertheless, the Commission report is, at best, incomplete.  This column examines three issues 
neglected by the report (state policies that encourage high local tax rates, the link between 
property taxes and expected levels of school services, and the need for more research and 
information about cost-saving educational policies) and the next column examines the 
Commission’s recommendation to place a cap on local property taxes. 
 
The first key point missed by the Commission report is that a central cause of the recent growth 
in school property taxes in New York is that the STAR program lowers the impact of tax 
increases on voters and encourages them to spend more.  This point, which is the subject of 
several of my previous columns, is mentioned in a footnote in the report, but not a single 
recommendation addresses it. 
 
The report calls for a “restructured STAR circuit breaker program” to replace some or all of 
STAR.  The report does not recognize, however, that a standard circuit breaker has exactly the 
same incentive problem as does STAR.  A circuit breaker rebates some or all of a homeowner’s 
property taxes once they reach a certain share of the homeowner’s income.  Hence, the burden of 
a property tax increase is lowered or even eliminated for all households with property taxes 
greater than or equal to this specified share.  As New York’s experience with STAR 
demonstrates, provisions that lower the burden of property tax increases for a large number of 
voters lead to higher property tax rates.  Consequently, a broad-based circuit-breaker program 
would undoubtedly lead to property tax increases, as well. 
 
This incentive problem could easily be solved simply by placing a maximum on the property tax 
rate used to calculate either the STAR exemption or the circuit-breaker rebate.  This possibility is 
not mentioned in the report. 
 
Second, the Commission report does not acknowledge that spending on education and hence the 
property tax burden depend on the quality and range of services that voters and state officials 
expect schools to deliver.  The state government cannot expect school districts to achieve higher 
and higher passing rates on more and more regents exams without spending more.  Voters cannot 
expect their district to provide a wide range of services, including art, music, and athletics, 
without spending far more than is required to reach expected passing rates on state tests.   
 
Indeed, the report gives the impression that the problem of property taxes would just go away if 
school districts could find a way to pay their teachers lower wages and give them lower benefits.  
In fact, however, lower wages and lower benefits would undoubtedly result in lower-quality 
teachers and undermine the state’s objectives for student performance.  Lowering the 
expectations placed on schools would lower expenses and property taxes, but this is an issue the 
Commission apparently does not want to even acknowledge.  I do not favor cuts in the quality 
and range of services delivered by school districts in New York, but an honest debate about 
property tax relief should begin by recognizing that implementing such cuts would be the best 
way to obtain property tax relief—and then by turning to other policies if that one is not 
acceptable. 
 
It is also ironic that some of the loudest complaints about high property taxes come from voters 
in wealthy districts.  It does not make sense to provide property tax relief in these districts by 
giving them more aid.  Voters in these districts face high property taxes because they have voted 
to have school systems that deliver an even wider range of high-quality services than other 
                                                     
2  As discussed in my March column, one appropriate policy response to unusually rapid property value increases in 
certain areas is a circuit-breaker that defers property tax increases until a house changes hands.  This policy removes 
the burden on low-income homeowners who live in places with rapid property appreciation.  The Commission 
promises to look into this type of policy, which they call a type of “reverse mortgage,” in its final report. 
districts in New York.  The state should not be easing the property tax burden in these districts 
while poor districts are still struggling to provide the basics.2   As my last column pointed out, 
recent changes have boosted the fairness of the state education aid formula in some ways, but the 
new aid system still provides a much larger share of state aid dollars to wealthy downstate 
districts than would an aid system based solely on a district’s needs and fiscal capacity.  
 
Third, the state does not provide school districts with the information they need to identify and 
implement cost-saving policies and practices.  For the most part, school officials do a good job 
using the resources they have based on available information. Stressed school districts are not in 
a position, however, to conduct research on new policies and practices—or even to keep up on 
all the latest information from research conducted in other states.  In my view, these jobs are the 
responsibility of the state government, and, in particular, of the New York State Education 
Department.  At present, NYSED does not have a data system that would allow researchers to 
track individual student performance; it does not have a set of procedures for conducting 
random-assignment experiments, which provide the most reliable information under most 
circumstances; it does not have a standard mechanism, such as a website, for providing school 
districts with information about the most effective programs for achieving various objectives; 
and it lacks adequate staff and expertise to conduct high-quality program evaluations.  Citizens 
around the state should insist that elected officials come up with funding for these tasks and that 
the NYSED undertake them. 
 
In short, any effective responses to the problem of high property tax rates in New York State 
should (1) revise the provisions in STAR (or in any circuit-breaker that replaces STAR) that 
encourage local voters to raise property tax rates, (2) identify the crucial school services that 
elected officials and voters demand and make sure the state aid budget helps all districts, 
especially the neediest, reach the selected targets, and (3) give NYSED the resources and staff it 
needs to help each district identify the policies and practices that would allow it to deliver its 
services in a cost-effective manner.  
